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1. Abstract
A sensor network operating in open environments requires a network-wide group key for con-
fidentiality of exchanged messages between sensor nodes. When a node behaves abnormally
due to its malfunction or a compromise attack by adversaries, the central sink node should
update the group key of other nodes. The major concern of this group key update procedure
will be the multi-hop communication overheads of the rekeying messages due to the energy
constraints of sensor nodes. Many researchers have tried to reduce the number of rekeying
messages by using the logical key tree. In this chapter, we propose an energy-efficient group
key management scheme called Topological Key Hierarchy (TKH). TKH generates a key tree
by using the underlying sensor network topology with consideration of subtree-based key
tree separation and wireless multicast advantage. Based on our detailed analysis and simula-
tion study, we compare the total rekeying costs of our scheme with the previous logical key
tree schemes and demonstrate its energy efficiency.
2. Introduction
Advances in wireless networking, embedded microprocessors, and micro-fabrication technol-
ogy have enabled a new generation of large-scale sensor networks which target a range of
commercial and military applications (Zhao & Guibas, 2004). A typical wireless sensor net-
work is composed of a large number of sensor nodes and one or several sinks collecting data
from them (Akyildiz et al., 2002). The sink broadcasts control messages to engage sensor
nodes into specific tasks. In response to the control messages, sensor nodes deliver the re-
quested data back to the sink collectively. Usually, a sink has lap-top class computing power
while sensor nodes have very limited computing resources. Even though it can vary by spe-
cific application scenarios of a sensor network, most sensor nodes are powered by limited
batteries. Therefore, energy efficiency should be considered as an important parameter dur-
ing the design of services or protocols for a sensor network. This also applies to the design of
security services. If we want to apply a security service to a sensor network, we should con-
sider the computation & communication efficiencies of the service in addition to its security
performances.
From the nature of multi-hop wireless communications, an adversary can easily eavesdrop
exchanged messages to gather secret information from a sensor network. Furthermore, it can
24
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Fig. 1. Classification of security services according to communication patterns.
also inject malicious control messages to disrupt normal operations of sensor nodes. There-
fore, in order to protect a sensor network from these attacks, we need authenticity and confi-
dentiality of exchanged messages.
In general, the authenticity and confidentiality of messages are provided by different secu-
rity primitives according to their underlying delivery mechanisms (unicast and broadcast) as
depicted in Fig.1. The unicast security provides authentication/encryption of unicast mes-
sages between a pair of nodes. For the unicast security, we use MAC (Message Authentication
Code) and symmetric encryption for the authenticity and confidentiality respectively while
the both schemes use the same pairwise key (PK) established between a pair of nodes. Since
there aremany standard algorithms for theMAC and encryption such as HMAC (Bellare et al.,
1997) and AES (U.S. DoC NIST, 2001) which can be efficiently run even on a sensor node, the
problem of the unicast security converted to the pairwise key establishment problem.
The broadcast security provides authentication/encryption of broadcast messages between
multiple nodes in a network. For the broadcast authenticity, we need new security primitives
called broadcast authentication. We can provide the broadcast confidentiality by using the sym-
metric encryption with the network-wide group key (GK). Unlike the pairwise key, it is hard
to secure the group key since it is known to every node in a network. Therefore, we need a
new security primitive called group key management which updates a group key when a node
joins/leaves a network.
While majority of researches on sensor network security have focused on pairwise key man-
agement schemes to provide the unicast security, there were not much research efforts to pro-
vide the broadcast security. However, the group security is more crucial security service com-
pared to the unicast security for a sensor network from the specific characteristics of a sensor
network:
• Broadcast communications are commonly used in sensor networks: Unlike the Internet en-
vironment where the server-client-based unicast communication type is prevalent, the
broadcast communications are commonly used in a sensor network since all sensor
nodes are usually controlled by a single administrative domain. A sink should continu-
ously control sensor nodes by using the broadcast control messages, while there are not
many scenarios where a pair of sensor nodes communicate each other.
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• Effects of the security breaches of the broadcast communications are much more devastating
in sensor networks: Without proper authentication mechanism, all sensors will react to
the false control messages from adversaries which can exhaust energies of all sensor
nodes. Also if a network-wide group key is compromised, all communications within a
network can be eavesdropped by an adversary. However, revealed pairwise keys from
a compromised node will not affect security of other links in a network. Therefore,
while the effects of security breaches of the pairwise connections are negligible to other
nodes, the compromise of the broadcast security affects the whole network.
• Existing security primitives for the group security are not applicable to sensor networks: The
existing solutions for the group security such as digital signature (Rivest et al., 1978) and
logical key hierarchy (LKH) (Wong et al., 1998) are inadequate to be applied to sensor
network environments due to their computation and communication overheads. While
the public key cryptography (PKC)-based pairwise key establishment scheme is also
computationally heavy, it only occurs once when a pair of sensor nodes first contact.
Thus sensors can adopt the PKC-based key establishment without much concerns in
energy. However, communication & computation overhead of the broadcast security
occurs frequently along with the broadcast messages which can exhaust energies of
sensor nodes.
Based on the above motivations for the development of the group security mechanisms for
wireless sensor networks, we investigate efficient & secure group key management schemes
in this chapter.
2.1 Group Key Managements in Wireless Sensor Networks
In a wireless sensor network (WSN), many sensor nodes collect data from their surroundings,
and report them to the central sink node (Akyildiz et al., 2002). The sink broadcasts control
messages to sensor nodes to regulate their sensing/reporting operations. From these many-to-
1 and 1-to-many communication characteristics, typical WSNs utilize a multicast tree topology
rooted from the sink. For the design of communication protocol on this topology, the energy
efficiency is the most important design principle due to sensor node’s energy constraints. This
also applies to the design of security services for WSNs. In addition to its security perfor-
mances, a security service should take into account the energy efficiency of its protocol.
The message confidentiality is the imperative security primitive for various security ser-
vices in a sensor network. Generally, a network-wide group key (GK) is used for message
en/decryption for the message confidentiality. The sink should occasionally update GK to
prevent a compromised node from decrypting messages. The simplest solution is to sepa-
rately distribute a new GK to each node after encrypting it by each node’s individual key
(IK) that is only shared between each node and the sink. However, this will generate O(N)
rekeying messages with the network size N.
The Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) scheme (Wallner et al., 1997) (Wong et al., 1998) reduces the
number of rekeying messages to O(log N) by building a tree of key encryption keys (KEKs).
Based on LKH, many researchers tried to further reduce the number of rekeying messages in
trade-off of local key computations (Canetti et al., 1999) (Sherman &McGrew, 2003) (Lin et al.,
2005). In these schemes, each node requires only several rekeying messages among the total
rekeying messages according to its logical position in a key tree. However, in a multi-hop
WSN where each node routes messages of other nodes, rekeying messages generated from
the logical key tree should be forwarded to many irrelevant nodes before reaching their desti-
nations. In other words, these logical key tree-based schemes can incur heavy communication
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Fig. 2. Taxonomy of group key management schemes.
overheads in multi-hop WSN environments since the key tree structure does not reflect the
underlying network topology.
In this chapter, we propse the Topological Key Hierarchy (TKH) scheme which generates a
key tree from the sensor network’s topology information. The basic principle is to enable
topologically adjacent nodes in a network to share the same KEKs so that they can receive the
same rekeying messages. Then each rekeying message can be delivered to its designated re-
cipients while minimizing communication costs. While the previous group key management
schemes only tried to minimize the number of rekeying messages, our TKH minimizes the to-
tal rekeying cost which reflects both the number of rekeying message and the communication costs of
rekeying messages. We demonstrate the energy saving of TKH compared to the previous logical
key tree-based schemes by using our detailed analysis and simulation study.
2.2 Related Works
A primary method to limit access to information within a group is the message encryption.
Along with the message to be encrypted, we need a cryptographic key only shared within a
group. Only those who knows the group key are able to decrypt the encrypted message. The
most challenging problem of this scenario is to update the group key according to member-
ship changes. We can divide the research literatures for this group key management problem
according to their group key establishment style.
In the Distributed approaches, members generate a group key in contributory manner by com-
bining their own secret information. Most of group key management schemes for sensor
networks mainly focus on the distributed group key management schemes (Zhang & Cao,
2005) (Chadha et al., 2006) (Panja et al., 2006). In these schemes, sensor nodes collaboratively
generate and update a group key without the help from a central sink node. However, estab-
lishing the group key in a large-scale network by using the distributed manner incurs much
overheads. First, these schemes incur computational overheads since they use complex algo-
rithms such as Polynomial (Blundo et al., 1992) (Staddon et al., 2002) or group Diffie-Hellman
(Diffie &Hellman, 1976) (Steiner et al., 1996) (Kim et al., 2000) methods between sensor nodes.
Also after the collaborative local group key generation procedure between neighbors, each lo-
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cal group key should bemergedwith other local group keys to generate a single network-wide
group key which requires multiple rounds of communications.
On the contrary, in the Centralized group key management scheme, a central key distribution
center (KDC) randomly generates a new group key and produces related rekeying messages,
which eliminates computation overheads of end nodes. Also, the communication costs are the
one-time delivery costs of rekeying messages from the KDC to all nodes. Therefore, we think
that the centralized group key management scheme is more preferable to a sensor network in
terms of rekeying procedure’s computation and communication overheads.
After introduction of the logical key hierarchy scheme independently by Wong et al. (Wong
et al., 1998) and Wallner et al. (Wallner et al., 1997) in Internet environment, many researchers
have tried to further reduce the number of rekeying messages by using the tradeoff between
central rekeying and local computation (Sherman & McGrew, 2003) (Lin et al., 2005). In
(Pietro et al., 2003), authors combined the directed diffusion data dissemination protocol (In-
tanagonwiwat et al., 2000) with LKH, and proposed LKHW (LKH for WSN) . LKHW is only
compatible with the directed diffusion routing protocol. Our TKH can be applied to any tree-
based routing algorithm .
Previously, Sun et al.(Sun et al., 2004) used topological information of a cellular network for
efficient group key management. While the wired network part from KDC to each BS (base
station) has abundant bandwidth which can easily carry O(log N) rekeying messages, the
wireless network part from BS to each MN (mobile node) suffers from scarce bandwidth. The
topological information on the latter part constantly changes due to the mobility of MNs.
Therefore, the scheme in (Sun et al., 2004) is superior to the LKH when MN’s mobility is not
very high. On the contrary, a typical sensor network is a multi-hop wireless network which
severely suffers from the limited bandwidth, and each sensor node does not have mobility in
most scenarios. Therefore, our TKH can outperform the LKH in most conditions. Also, the hi-
erarchical cellular network topology is quite different from the multi-hop wireless sensor net-
work. Recently, Salido et al. (Salido et al., 2008) proposed VP3 (Vertex-Path, Power-Proximity)
scheme for topology-based key management in multi-hop wireless ad hoc network environ-
ments. However, they assume dynamic power control capability of each node which is not
the case for a sensor network. Also, they assume a subset of nodes belong to a certain group
according to application scenarios where all nodes form a group in a sensor network.
3. Logical Key Tree-based Group Key Management
3.1 Logical Key Hierarchy & Related Schemes
The Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) (Wallner et al., 1997) (Wong et al., 1998) is a centralized
group key management scheme which utilizes the logical key tree. A key tree is maintained
at the central KDC (Key Distribution Center) and the corresponding rekeying messages are
delivered to all nodes when a node joins or leaves a group. A GK (Group Key) which is the
root of a key tree is used to encrypt all data traffic within a group. KEKs (Key Encryption
Keys) which reside in intermediate edges of a key tree are used to update the root GK and
other KEKs. The leaves of a key tree are IKs (Individual Keys) which are individually shared
by each node and the KDC. As a result, each node in a group possesses three kinds of keys:
its own IK, KEKs (on the path to the root), and a root GK. Figure 3 denotes an example of the
logical key tree. By using this example, let us examine the key tree update procedures of both
‘Node Join’ and ‘Node Leave’ events.
www.intechopen.com
Sustainable Wireless Sensor Networks552
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
GK
IK3IK1
KII-1
IK2 IK4
KII-2
IK5 IK9IK7
KII-3
IK8IK6
10 11 12
IK12IK10
KII-4
IK11
KI-1 KI-2
Group Key
Individual
Key
Key
Encryption
Keys
Fig. 3. A logical key tree example consisted of 12 nodes.
3.1.1 Node Join
First, let us assume that there were only eleven nodes initially in Figure 3, then the node
12 newly joins the group. Let {KA}KB denote key KA encrypted by key KB, and K
′ denote
the updated version of key K. The keys that will be possessed by the joining node (GK,
KI−2, KII−4) should be updated to prevent the node from decrypting the previously exchanged
messages within the group (Backward Secrecy) (Kim et al., 2000). After rekeying messages
{GK′}GK, {K
′
I−2}KI−2 , {K
′
II−4}KII−4 are sent to the existing members, the node 12 receives {GK
′,
K′I−2, K
′
II−4}IK12 . However, the rekeying messages for the existing members can be safely re-
placed by local key computations (Waldvogel et al., 1999). Each subset of nodes can locally
compute keys as {1∼11} : GK′= f (GK), {7∼11} : K′I−2= f (KI−2), {10∼11} : K
′
II−4= f (KII−4)
with a common one-way function f . It means that the group key update for a node join event
only incurs a rekeying message unicast to the joining node.
3.1.2 Node Leave
Second, let us assume that there were initially twelve nodes and the node 12 leaves the group.
Then the possessed keys of the leaving node also should be updated to prevent the leaving
node from decrypting the future messages (Forward Secrecy) (Kim et al., 2000). In this case,
however, several current keys cannot be used in the rekeying procedure since the leaving
node also knows them. Therefore, more complicated rekeying messages are generated and
delivered to the remaining nodes. During the generation of the rekeying messages at KDC,
there are two different rekeying strategies in LKH: group-oriented rekeying (LKH(g)) and user-
oriented rekeying (LKH(u)) according to the underlying rekeyingmessage deliverymechanisms
(Wong et al., 1998)1:
LKH(g)
{
mKDC→all : {GK
′}K′I−1 ||{GK
′}K′I−2 ||{K
′
I−2}KII−3
||{K′I−2}K′II−4 ||{K
′
II−4}IK10 ||{K
′
II−4}IK11
(1)
LKH(u)


mKDC→{1∼6} : {GK
′}KI−1
mKDC→{7∼9} : {GK
′, K′I−2}KII−3
mKDC→{10} : {GK
′, K′I−2, K
′
II−4}IK10
mKDC→{11} : {GK
′, K′I−2, K
′
II−4}IK11 .
(2)
1 The key-oriented rekeying defined in (Wong et al., 1998) is not considered in this chapter since it equals to
the user-oriented rekeying in terms of the number of rekeying messages and their delivery mechanism.
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In the group-oriented rekeying, KDC combines all rekeying messages and broadcasts the whole
messages to all nodes. Upon receiving the whole messages, each node selects its messages and
decrypts the necessary keys. In the user-oriented rekeying, KDC generates rekeying messages
for each subset of nodes and multicasts (or unicasts) each rekeying message only to the corre-
sponding subset of nodes. While the group-oriented rekeying generates the smaller number of
rekeying messages in total, it incurs more communication overheads in multi-hop WSN since
all sensors should receive and forward the whole messages. Even the user-oriented rekeying
is more energy-efficient, it requires multicast routing protocol to deliver messages. Without
the multicast support in WSNs, rekeying messages for a subset of nodes will be separately
delivered to them by unicast.
McGrew and Sherman proposed an improvement over LKH called One-way Function Tree
(OFT) (Sherman & McGrew, 2003). OFT reduces the number of rekeying messages from
(2 log2 N) to (log2 N) in the binary key tree by using the local key computations (Waldvogel
et al., 1999) similar to the node join operation. However, OFT is susceptible to node collusion
attacks (Horng, 2002) (Ku & Chen, 2003). There are similar approaches that achieve the same
communication overhead as OFT without node collusion vulnerabilities: One-way Function
Chain (OFC) (Canetti et al., 1999), and One-way Key Derivation (OKD) (Lin et al., 2005).
In the One-way Key Derivation, KDC reduces the number of rekeying messages by not send-
ing the rekeying messages to nodes that can derive the keys by themselves. Therefore, when
node 12 is revoked in Figure 3, the keys can be locally derived in each subset of nodes:
{1∼6} : GK′ = f (KI−1⊕GK), {7∼9} : K
′
I−2 = f (K
′
II−3⊕KI−2), {10} : K
′
II−4 = f (IK10⊕KII−4).
Here, f denotes a one-way function and ⊕ denotes an exclusive-or computation. After the
local key computations, KDC transmits the corresponding rekeying messages to the remain-
ing subset of nodes either by using group-oriented rekeying (OKD(g)) or user-oriented rekeying
(OKD(u)) methods:
OKD(g)
{
mKDC→all : {GK
′}K′I−2 ||{K
′
I−2}K′II−4 ||{K
′
II−4}IK11 (3)
OKD(u)


mKDC→{7∼9} : {GK
′}K′ I−2
mKDC→{10} : {GK
′, K′I−2}K′II−4
mKDC→{11} : {GK
′, K′I−2, K
′
II−4}IK11 .
(4)
Comparing (1)(2) with (3)(4), it is evident that OKD reduces the number of rekeying messages
in trade-off of the local key computations.
3.1.3 Total Rekeying Costs
When a group key management scheme properly updates a group key when a node joins or
leaves the group as described above, the Backward Secrecy and Forward Secrecy properties
are preserved (Kim et al., 2000). Since LKH, OKD, and our TKH are designed to preserve both
properties, we argue that they are equal in terms of the security level. However, our TKH
achieves the same security level with smaller amount of rekeying cost compared to the logical
key tree based schemes including LKH and OKD.
To quantitatively compare the rekeying costs, we define the Total Rekeying Cost (TRC) of a
group key management scheme as the product of the number of rekeying messages and the com-
munication costs of the rekeying messages. Previously, most group key management schemes
tried to reduce the number of rekeying messages (Rafaeli & Hutchison, 2003). However, it is
also important to deliver rekeying messages efficiently to its designated recipients in multi-
hop WSN environments. Generally, 1) OKD incurs smaller TRC compared to LKH due to the
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reduced number of rekeying messages, and 2) the user-oriented rekeying incurs smaller TRC
compared to the group-oriented rekeying since each node receives/forwards the smaller num-
ber of messages. However, OKD’s user-oriented rekeying, currently the most communication-
efficient logical key tree-based scheme, is not optimal in multi-hop WSN environments from
the following reasons.
First, the multicast routing incurs heavy storage and communication overheads in WSN. Un-
like the Internet environment where routers and end-hosts are separated in functionality, each
sensor should act as both a router and an end-host in WSNs. Therefore, every sensor should
maintain routes to all sensors to support multicast routing. This is infeasible for the resource
constrained sensor nodes specifically in large scale networks. Second, even if the multicast
routing is supported, it is hard to expect multicast advantage (minimally using the network
resources before reaching multiple destinations) with the logical key tree-based schemes. For
example, if nodes {7, 8, 9} receiving {GK′}K′ I−2 in equation (4) are distinctly located in a net-
work, this one multicast session will incur the similar multi-hop communication overheads
as three unicast sessions to each of them. To overcome these constraints, we propose Topo-
logical Key Hierarchy that does not require multicast routing protocol and utilize multicast
advantage by mapping the topological neighbors to the key tree neighbors.
4. Topological Key Hierarchy
In this section, we provide design principles, key tree generation, and key tree update proce-
dures of Topological Key Hierarchy. TKH operates without the multicast routing and mini-
mizes the network usages by using the topology-mapped key tree structure.
4.1 Design Principles
In the key tree-based schemes, the nodes sharing the same KEKmostly receive the same rekey-
ing messages. In order to assign a KEK for a group of topologically adjacent nodes, we use
two kinds of tree topology information: Subtree and Sibling information.
4.1.1 Subtree-based Key Tree Separation (Tree Key)
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ST1 (subtree)
ST2
sink
sr1
sr3sr2
ST3
(a)
IKsr1
sr1
TK1 TK3
IKsr3
sr3
TK2
IKsr2
sr2
GK
(b)
Fig. 4. (a) A sensor network topology and (b) the corresponding TK assignment.
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First, we make the nodes in the same subtree share the same KEK called Tree Key (TK). The
subtree is a tree with nodes below each subroot node, where subroot nodes are direct neigh-
bors of a sink. The sample sensor network topology and its tree key assignment is depicted
in Figure 4. From the three subtree branches, three tree keys (TK1, TK2, TK3) are mapped to
nodes in each subtree. From this key tree separation, rekeying messages for each subtree will
be different from those of other subtrees. It means that TKH separates rekeying messages and
delivers each subset only to the corresponding subtree. Nodes in each subtree are required to
receive and forward rekeying messages only destined to nodes in their subtree.
4.1.2 Wireless Multicast Advantage Utilization (Sibling Key)
3
4
2
c1,3
c1,4
1
c1,2
(a)
IK4IK2 IK3
2 3 4
SK
TK
(b)
Fig. 5. a) A sensor network topology and (b) the corresponding SK assignment.
Second, we make the nodes sharing the same parent node in a tree topology (sibling nodes) to
share the same KEK called Sibling Key (SK). For a node in a tree, a parent node is a neighbor
node that delivers messages from the root sink node. In a wireless medium, since a message
transmission can be heard by multiple neighbors, sibling nodes can efficiently receive a mes-
sage by a single transmission from their parent. For example in Figure 5.(a) where node 1
has three one-hop neighbors {2, 3, 4} in a wireless network, the costs of multicasting a single
message to them is Cmulticast =max (c1,2, c1,3, c1,4) where ci,j is a unicast cost from node i to
j. Therefore, the one-hop multicast in a wireless medium can save energy from the broadcast
nature of a wireless medium.
However, the important necessary condition for this wireless multicast advantage is that the
message destined to neighbors should be the same. In other words, even if we have n one-hop
neighbors which can be heard simultaneously, if the messages destined to them are different
from each other, we have no choice but to unicast the messages one-by-one to each recipient.
For rekeying messages generated from a key tree, we can make the same message to be des-
tined to specific nodes by locating them under the same KEK. Therefore, we make children
nodes of a parent node to share a SK to utilize the wireless multicast advantage.
4.2 Key Tree Generation
Based on the previous design principles, constructing a TKH key tree is composed of three
steps: 1) Routing Tree Construction, 2) Routing Tree Learning, and 3) Key Tree Generation. How-
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Fig. 6. (a) Routing Tree Construction and (b) Routing Tree Learning procedures.
ever, if a sensor network is already employing the tree-based routing and a central sink knows
the topology information, TKH does not require the first two steps. For example, in a ZigBee-
based WSN utilizing the tree-based hierarchical routing (ZigBee Alliance, 2006), the central
sink can immediately generate the topology-based key tree by using the current topology in-
formation. If a WSN does not operate a tree-based routing, TKH needs to setup a sink-based
routing tree to generate a topology-mapped key tree. Also the constructed routing tree will be
used to deliver rekeying messages afterwards.
4.2.1 Routing Tree Construction
Constructing an efficient multicast source tree has been an active research area both in wired
(Diot et al., 1997) and wireless (Wieselthier et al., 2002) networks. Here we introduce a sim-
ple routing tree construction method while TKH can generate a key tree from any routing
tree construction method. After sensor node deployment, a sink broadcasts Cost Advertise-
ment (CA) message to make sensor nodes to setup paths to the sink node. Each CA message
contains three information: 1) node ID, 2) hop count to the sink, and 3) parent node ID. For
example in Figure 6.(a), the node 3’s CA message is ‘[3|2H|1]’ since node ‘3’ is ‘2 Hops’ away
from the sink through the parent node ‘1’. After hearing CA messages, a node chooses its
parent node which has the minimum hop count to the sink (if multiple CA messages have the
same hop count value, a node can choose the CA message received with the highest SNR).
After selecting a parent node, each node also broadcasts its own CAmessage to neighbors. By
overhearing CA messages, a parent node can learn the association of its children nodes with
itself. In Figure 6.(a), by overhearing CA messages of nodes {2, 3, 4}, node 1 learns that it is
associated with three children nodes. This routing tree construction procedure continues until
it reaches all nodes.
4.2.2 Routing Tree Learning
After construction of a tree topology, every parent node reports Parent-Child Relationship (PCR)
message to the sink. Each PCR message contains two information: 1) parent node ID and 2)
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Fig. 7. (a) A sensor network tree topology example and (b) the corresponding TKH key tree
structure. We depict the keys that need to be updated as shaded circles when node 2 is re-
voked.
children node IDs. For example in Figure 6.(b), node 1’s PCR message is [1|2, 3, 4] since it has
three children nodes. After collecting all PCR messages, the sink can learn the whole network
topology like Figure 6.(b). Also, during the PCR message forwardings, each parent node can
learn and save its descendant node IDs in Descendants Tree. For example, by overhearing
PCR messages from node 3 and 4, node 1 can build its Descendants Tree like in Figure 6.(b).
By maintaining this tree, each parent can only forward messages destined to its descendants
which prevents redundant message forwarding. Therefore, the routing overhead of TKH is
only to maintain Descendants Tree in each parent node.
4.2.3 Key Tree Generation
Based on the topology information obtained from the previous tree learning procedure, now
the sink can build a topology-based key tree. Before describing the key tree generation pro-
cedure, we first define several parameters (we show an example of each parameter by using
the sample topology of Figure 7.(a)): We describe the key tree generation algorithm of TKH in
Figure 8. As an example, Figure 7.(b) depicts the corresponding key tree structure generated
from the topology of Figure 7.(a). In addition to GK and IK, Tree Key (TK) is shared by nodes
in the same subtree (ST) and Sibling Key (SK) is shared by nodes in the same sibling set (ss).
TKH has an advantage that the depth of the key tree is bounded to ‘4’ independent of the
network size. Therefore, each sensor is only required to save maximum four keys which are
beneficial for storage-limited sensor nodes. In contrast, the logical key tree-based schemes
should increase the depth of the key tree according to the network size in order to maintain
the optimal tree degree (LKH and OKD achieve the best performance with the tree degree
of 4 and 2 respectively (Li et al., 2001) (Lin et al., 2005)). Therefore, they should increase the
number of keys in each sensor node as network grows.
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parameter definition
T a tree topology with a sink at its root and sensors at vertices
N the total number of sensor nodes in T
l a number of revoked sensor nodes during a rekeying interval
sri i-th subroot node (e.g. sr1=1, sr2= a, sr3=b in Figure 7.(a))
STi i-th subtree with sri as the subroot
Ni a set of all nodes in STi (e.g. N1={1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8})
ssi,j j-th sibling set in STi (nodes connected to the same parent)
a single child consists a single-node sibling set without SK assignment;
(e.g. ss1,1={1}, ss1,2={2, 3, 4}, ss1,3={5, 6, 7}, ss1,4={8})
rni a set of revoked nodes in STi (e.g. rn1={2})
rnsi a set of revoked node’s sibling nodes in STi
(e.g. rns1={3, 4})
RST a set of subtrees which have revoked nodes in its vertices
(e.g. RST={ST1})
etx energy dissipated during 1-bit transmission by a sensor node
erx energy dissipated during 1-bit reception by a sensor node
cui,j wireless unicast cost delivering 1-bit from node i to j
(cui,j = etx+erx)
cmi,{1,··· ,n} wireless multicast cost delivering 1-bit from node i to its n neighbors,
(cmi,{1,··· ,n}= etx+n·erx)
Table 1. Parameters for TKH algorithm explanation.
4.3 Key Tree Update
When a sensor node is newly deployed or revoked, a routing tree and the corresponding key
tree should also be updated. One may think that the sink does not need to update the group
key when a sensor node dies due to energy exhaustion. However, it is secure to update the
group key also in this scenario since it is hard to verify by the remote sink whether the non-
responding sensor node is pretending to be energy-less due to compromise attack. Therefore,
we assume that the revocation of a sensor node take places when it is compromised or it runs
out of energy.
Key tree update is composed of three steps: 1) Routing Tree Repair, 2) Routing Tree Re-learning,
and 3) Key Tree Update. However, if a sensor network is already employing a tree-based routing
or if node join or revocation events do not affect the topology of the remaining nodes, TKH
does not require the first two steps.
4.3.1 Routing Tree Repair
When a node joins or leaves a network, a routing tree of the remaining node can be modified
according to the node’s topological position.
– Node Join: A newly deployed sensor node firstly broadcasts join request to neighbors. Then
each neighbor reply CA messages containing its hop count to the sink. After selecting the
parent node, the new node sends its CA message containing the parent ID. Then the selected
parent reports a new PCR message to the sink which then locates the new node to the key
tree according to its topological position. A joining node can either 1) create a new single-node
sibling set or 2) join the existing sibling set. In both cases, the existing nodes can change the
corresponding GK, TK, and SK by using the pre-shared one-way function same as the node
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Input: a tree topology T, all nodes’ individual keys (IKs)
Output: a key tree
1) generate a group key (GK)
2) for (each STi) do
if |Ni| = 1 then
attach sri’s IK to GK
else (|Ni| ≥ 2)
generate a new tree key TKi and attach it to GK
for each ssi,j in STi do
if
∣∣∣ssi,j
∣∣∣ = 1 then
attach IK of the node in ssi,j to TKi
else
(∣∣∣ssi,j
∣∣∣ ≥ 2
)
generate a new sibling key (SK) and attach it to TKi
attach all IKs of nodes in ssi,j to SK
end if
end for
end if
end for
3) return a key tree
Fig. 8. Key Tree Generation Algorithm of TKH.
join procedure in Section 2.1.1. The new node receives the corresponding keys from the sink
afterwards. Therefore, we do not consider the node join event since the topology change and
the corresponding rekeying cost is negligible.
– Node Revocation: We further classify the node revocation event into 1) leaf node revocation and
2) non-leaf node revocation. The leaf node revocation does not affect the topology of the remain-
ing nodes and the sink can send the rekeying messages based on the current key tree. For
example in Figure 7.(a), revocation of the leaf node ‘2’ does not affect the network topology,
and rekeying messages can be generated from the current key tree of Figure 7.(b). However,
the non-leaf node revocation can disconnect the network topology, and the sink should wait
until the orphaned nodes of the revoked parent find new parent nodes. For the routing tree
repair, each orphaned node performs the same procedure as the node join case.
4.3.2 Routing Tree Re-learning
If the sink revokes a non-leaf parent node, it waits until it receives new PCR messages from
new parents of the orphaned nodes. After receiving PCR messages, the sink modifies the
current key hierarchy based on the modified network topology. For example in Figure 9.(a),
after revocation of node 3, the sink waits until it receives new PCR messages containing the
orphaned nodes {5, 6, 7}. Then node 2 and 3, new parents of {5, 6, 7} report their new PCR
messages to the sink. Also by overhearing these new PCR messages, other nodes along the
path to the sink modifies their Descendants Tree. Finally, the sink can send the rekeying mes-
sages based on the modified key tree structure.
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Fig. 9. After non-leaf node 3 in Figure 7 is revoked, a) the repaired routing tree with the
re-learning procedure and b) the modified key tree structure.
4.3.3 Key Tree Update
Based on the modified key tree structure, the sink send the corresponding rekeying messages
to each subset of nodes. By using the example of Figure 9, we examine the rekeying message
delivery procedures in detail. When the non-leaf node 3 in ST1 is revoked, rekeying mes-
sages (m) and the corresponding communication cost (C) to deliver m from the sink (s) to its
recipients are


ms→{1} : {GK
′, TK′1}IK1
ms→{2,4} : {GK
′, TK′1}SK′1
ms→{5,6} : {GK
′, TK′1}SK2
ms→{7,8} : {GK
′, TK′1}SK3
ms→2 : {SK
′
1}IK2
ms→4 : {SK
′
1}IK4
ms→7 : {SK3}IK7


Cs→{1} : etx+erx
Cs→{2,4} : 2etx + 3erx
Cs→{5,6} : 3etx + 4erx
Cs→{7,8} : 3etx + 4erx
Cs→2 : 2etx + 2erx
Cs→4 : 2etx + 2erx
Cs→7 : 3etx + 3erx.
Rekeying messages for ST2 and ST3 are {GK
′}TK2 and {GK
′}TK3 respectively. Upon receiving
each rekeying message, a node can route it to one of its children nodes based on its Descen-
dants Tree. Nodes in the same sibling set ({2, 4}, {5, 6}, {7, 8}) will receive the same rekeying
messages by using the wireless multicast advantage from their parents.
Comparing Figure 7.(b) and Figure 9.(b), we observe that the sibling sets sharing SK2 and SK3
are slightly changed. However, TKH does not update SK2 and SK3 since none of the sensors
sharing them are revoked. By maintaining the link from node 7 to SK2 in the key tree, the sink
can update both SK2 and SK3 later when node 7 is revoked. Finally, the total rekeying cost
(TRC) of ST1 is calculated as
TRCST1 = 2|m|×
(
Cs→{1}+Cs→{2,4}+Cs→{5,6}+Cs→{7,8}
)
+ |m|×(Cs→2+Cs→4+Cs→7+Cs→8) = |m| (25etx+31erx) .
sink
 sibling sets 
in each subtree
 nodes 
in each sibling set
 subtrees
GK
TK
SK SK
IK IK IK IK IK
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Fig. 10. (a) ‘αβγ-tree’ and (b) the corresponding TKH key tree structure.
where |m| is the size of a unit rekeying message {KA}KB (2|m| for {KA, KB}KC ). It means that
we need 25 transmissions and 31 receptions of a unit rekeying messages to update ST1 when
node 3 is revoked.
5. Analysis of the Total Rekeying Cost
In this section, we analyze and compare the total rekeying costs of LKH, OKD, and TKH in
multi-hop WSN environments. For the analysis, we need to derive the average number of
rekeying messages and the communication costs. The former is derived in Section 4.3 by
employing the bins-and-balls problem. To calculate the latter, we model a typical WSN topology
as ‘αβγ-tree’ in Section 4.1. Both results are used to derive the total rekeying costs in Section
4.4 while the communication costs of the routing tree maintenance are calculated in Section
4.2.
5.1 ‘αβγ-tree’ Topology Model
For the analysis of the communication cost, we model a sensor network topology by using
‘αβγ-tree’ model. In the αβγ-tree, there are ‘α’ subtree branches from the sink, and each sub-
tree has ‘β’ sibling sets, and each sibling set has ‘γ’ sibling nodes. The resulting topology and
the corresponding TKH key tree structure is depicted in Figure 10.(a) and (b) respectively. The
total number of sensor nodes excluding a sink is N = α(βγ+1) and each subtree has (βγ+1)
nodes. Among N sensor nodes, (αβ) nodes are non-leaf parents and the rest (α(βγ+1)−αβ)
nodes are leaf children nodes. During the routing tree repair in αβγ-tree, we assume that a
revoked non-leaf parent node is replaced by one of its siblings, and a revoked subroot node is
replaced by one of its children.
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5.2 Cost of Routing Tree Maintenance
When there are N nodes in a network, each node can be identified by using ⌈log2 N⌉ bits, and
the hop count value ranging from 0 to β can be identified by ⌈log2 β⌉ bits. Then the size of the
CA message (|mCA|) and the PCR message (|mPCR|) are respectively
|mCA|=2⌈log2 N⌉+⌈log2 β⌉, |mPCR|=(γ+1)⌈log2 N⌉
where ⌈x⌉ denotes the smallest integer equal or greater than x (⌊x⌋ denotes the largest integer
equal or smaller than x).
5.2.1 Routing Tree Construction & Learning
The communication cost of the ‘Routing Tree Construction & Learning’ (CCL) defined in Sec-
tion 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 is derived as
CCL= |mCA|
{
(N+1)·etx+Nγ·erx
}
+|mPCR|
{
αβ · avg(1, β)(etx+erx)
}
(5)
where avg(1, n) = 1+2+···+nn =
(n+1)
2
(
sum(1, n) = 1+2+· · ·+n = n(n+1)2
)
. We assume that
every sensor plus the sink broadcast one CAmessage and each sensor receives γ CAmessages
on average. PCR messages are generated by all αβ parent nodes and they require avg(1, β)
hops to reach the sink.
5.2.2 Routing Tree Repair & Re-Learning
Also the communication cost of the ‘Routing Tree Repair & Re-learning’ (CRR) defined in
Section 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 is derived as follows
CRR= |mPCR|
min(l,αβ)
∑
i=0
C
αβ
i C
α(βγ+1)−αβ
l−i
C
α(βγ+1)
l
×i×avg(1, β)(etx+erx) (6)
where Cab is the binomial coefficient. Among the total α(βγ + 1) nodes, only revocations of αβ
parent nodes incur new PCR message reports. The corresponding mPCR should be delivered
to the sink along avg(1, β) hops.
5.3 Average Number of Rekeying Messages
5.3.1 Basic Functions
When l nodes are revoked, B(l, v,w) calculates the average number of intermediate KEKs that
need to be updated. v is the total number of intermediate KEKs at a certain key tree level,
where each KEK on that level is shared by w nodes. By analogy, B(l, v,w) is equivalent to the
average number of non-full bins when l balls are randomly picked out from v identical bins
each filled with w balls. The picked-out balls represent revoked nodes and the non-full bins
represent KEKs need to be updated. The number of non-full bin (n(l, v,w)) is in the range of
⌈l/w⌉≤n(l, v,w)≤min(l, v). Then, B(l, v,w) is represented as
B(l, v,w)E[n(l, v,w)]=
min(l,v)
∑
i=⌈l/w⌉
Pr{n(l, v,w)= i} × i.
In the above equation,
Pr{n(l, v,w)= i}=Cvi ·N(l, i,w)/C
vw
l
www.intechopen.com
Group Key Managements in Wireless Sensor Networks 563
where N(l, i,w) is the number of ways that there is no full bins when l balls are picked out
from i bins containing w balls each. N(l, i,w) is calculated by using the inclusion-exclusion
principle (Tucker, 1995, Ch. 3) which results
B(l, v,w) =
min(l,v)
∑
i=⌈l/w⌉
Cvi ·
(
∑
i−⌈l/w⌉
j=0 (−1)
jCijC
w(i−j)
l
)
Cvwl
× i. (7)
Another function B(l, v,w) calculates the average number of intermediate KEKs that do not need
to be updated since all the nodes shared the same KEK are revoked. B(l, v,w) is equivalent to
the average number of empty bins when l balls are randomly picked out from v identical bins
each filled with w balls, and calculated as
B(l, v,w)=
⌊l/w⌋
∑
i=max(l−vw+v,0)
Cvi ·
(
∑
⌊l/w⌋−i
j=0 (−1)
jCv−ij C
w(v−i−j)
l−w(i+j)
)
Cvwl
× i. (8)
Finally, B(l, v,w) defined as the difference between (7) and (8) is the actual average number
of intermediate KEKs that need to be updated on a certain key tree level when l nodes are
revoked
B(l, v,w)=B(l, v,w)−B(l, v,w). (9)
While the analysis in this subsection is motivated by the previous results (Sun et al., 2004,
Appendix A), we improve them in that 1) we provide non-recursive, closed-form solutions
for the bins-and-balls problem and 2) we also analyze the number of KEKs that do not need
to be updated by introducing B(l, v,w).
5.3.2 Average Number of Rekeying Messages
We denote a key tree of N nodes as T(d1,· · ·, dh) where di is the degree of a vertex at the i-th
level from the top and h is the height of the tree (∴d1×· · ·×dh =N). For example, the key tree
in Figure 3 is denoted as T(2, 2, 3). For the simplicity in equations, we assume d0 = dh+1 = 1.
When l nodes are revoked, the average number of total rekeying messages of LKH and OKD
generated by group-oriented rekeying are respectively
|MLKH(g)| =
{
d1+
h−1
∑
i=1
B
(
l,
i
∏
j=1
dj,
h
∏
k=i+1
dk
)
·di+1−l
}
−
{
h−1
∑
i=1
B
(
l,
i
∏
j=1
dj,
h
∏
k=i+1
dk
)}
(10)
|MOKD(g)| =
{
(d1−1)+
h−1
∑
i=1
B
(
l,
i
∏
j=1
dj,
h
∏
k=i+1
dk
)
·(di−1)−l
}
. (11)
With parameters N = 12, d1 = 2, d2 = 2, d3 = 3, h = 3, l = 1 of Figure 3, the number of rekeying
messages are calculated as |MLKH(g)|= 6 and |MLKH(g)|= 3 by using the above (10) and (11),
and they are consistent with (1) and (3) respectively.
For the user-oriented rekeying, we assume that each rekeyingmessage is delivered to its recip-
ient by unicast without multicast routing support in WSNs. For example in (13), mKDC→{7∼9} :
{GK′}K′I−2 is calculated as 3 rekeyingmessages unicast to (7, 8, 9) independently. When l nodes
are revoked, the average number of total rekeying messages of LKH and OKD generated by
user-oriented rekeying are respectively
|MLKH(u)|=
h
∑
i=1
{
i×
(
B
(
l,
i−1
∏
j=0
dj,
h
∏
k=i
dk
)
·di−B
(
l,
i
∏
j=1
dj,
h+1
∏
k=i+1
dk
))
·
( h+1
∏
k=i+1
dk
)}
(12)
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i mi |mi| txi rxi (dest+relay)
1 {GK}TK α −B(l, α, βγ+1) β + 1 (N − l)+ 0
2 {TK}SK B(l, α, βγ+1)(β + 1) avg(1, β+1) NR(l)+B(l, α, βγ+1)·sum(1, β)
3 {SK}IK Nr(l) avg(2, β+1) Nr(l)+Nr(l)·avg(1, β)
Table 2. For each rekeying message (mi) in TKH, the number of rekeying messages (|mi|), the
number of transmissions per message (txi), and the total number of receptions at destinations
and relay nodes (rxi) are derived.
|MOKD(u)|=
h−1
∑
i=0
{
i×
(
B
(
l,
i
∏
j=0
dj,
h
∏
k=i+1
dk
)
·di+1−B
(
l,
i+1
∏
j=1
dj,
h+1
∏
k=i+2
dk
))
+ (13)
(
B
(
l,
i
∏
j=0
dj,
h
∏
k=i+1
dk
)
·(di+1−1)−B
(
l,
i+1
∏
j=1
dj,
h+1
∏
k=i+2
dk
)
+B
(〈
l/
h+1
∏
j=i+2
dj
〉
,
i
∏
j=0
dj, di+1
))+}(h+1
∏
j=i+2
dj
)
.
In (13), (x)+ is defined as {x if x ≥ 0, 0 if x < 0} and < x>=⌊x+0.5⌋. With the parameters of
Figure 3, the number of rekeyingmessages are calculated as |MLKH(u)|=18 and |MOKD(u)|=8
by using the above (12) and (13), and they are consistent with (2) and (4) respectively.
TKH has three kinds of rekeying messages (mi): {GK}TK, {TK}SK, and {SK}IK. From the key
tree structure of Figure 10.(b) generated from the αβγ-tree topology, the average number of
rekeying messages are calculated in |mi| column of Table 2.
5.4 Total Rekeying Costs
By using both the previous results on the average number of rekeying messages and the αβγ-
tree model for calculation of the communication costs, we derive the total rekeying costs of
LKH, OKD, and TKH as follows
TRCLKH(g) =
∣∣MLKH(g)∣∣×{α(β+1)·etx+(N−l)·erx}|m| (14)
TRCOKD(g) =
∣∣MOKD(g)∣∣×{α(β+1)·etx+(N−l)·erx}|m| (15)
TRCLKH(u) =
∣∣MLKH(u)∣∣×{avg(1, β)·(etx+erx)}|m|+CCL+CRR (16)
TRCOKD(u) =
∣∣MOKD(u)∣∣×{avg(1, β)·(etx+erx)}|m|+CCL+CRR (17)
TRCTKH = ∑
∀mi
{(
|mi|×txi
)
·etx+
(
rxi
)
·erx
}
|m|+CCL+CRR. (18)
In group-oriented rekeying ((14) and (15)), all rekeying messages are broadcast to all nodes
requiring α(β + 1) transmissions and (N − l) receptions within a network. In user-oriented
rekeying ((16) and (17)), each rekeying message is independently unicast to each node requir-
ing avg(1, β) transmissions and receptions on average. While the group-oriented rekeying is
independent of the network topology, the user-oriented rekeying and TKH requires topology
information to deliver rekeyingmessages (reflected by CCL+CRR in (16), (17), and (18)). There-
fore, LKH(u), OKD(u), and TKH requires additional CCL and CRR costs in the total rekeying
cost. In TKH, for each rekeying message (mi), we calculate the average number of rekeying
messages (|mi|), the number of transmissions per message (txi), and the total number of re-
ceptions at destinations and relay nodes (rxi) in Table 2. Here NR(l) and Nr(l) are defined
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and derived as follows
NR(l) = {avg. # of nodes in revoked subtrees} (19)
= ∑
∀STi∈RST
|Ni|= B(l, α, βγ+1)(βγ+1)−
(
l−B(l, α, βγ+1)(βγ+1)
)
Nr(l) = {avg. # of revoked nodes’ sibling nodes} (20)
= ∑
∀STi∈RST
|rnsi| =
min(l,α)
∑
k=max(0,l−αβγ)
Cα
k
C
αβγ
l−k
C
α(βγ+1)
l
(
B(l−k, αβ,γ)γ−(l−k)
)
.
5.5 Analysis Results
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Fig. 11. Total rekeying costs of LKH, OKD, and TKH.
www.intechopen.com
Sustainable Wireless Sensor Networks566
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
tot
al 
rek
ey
ing
 co
st 
[J]
total number of nodes (N)
 LKH(g) binary
 LKH(g) 4-ary
 OKD(g) 4-ary
 OKD(g) binary
 TKH
1024256128 512
(a) l=1 (group-oriented)
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Fig. 12. Total rekeying costs of LKH, OKD, and TKH.
We plot the total rekeying costs (TRC) of LKH, OKD, and TKH in Figure 11 and 12. We vary
the total number of nodes (N) as 128, 256, 512, and 1024 by varying (α, β,γ) tuples as (2,7,9),
(4,7,9), (8,7,9), and (16,7,9). We consider two logical key trees (binary and 4-ary) for LKH
and OKD, while key trees of TKH are directly determined by (α, β,γ) values of each N. The
unit rekeying message size is set to |m| = 128 bits. The unit communication costs are set to
etx = 0.209[µJ] and erx = 0.226[µJ] from the characteristics of the CC2420 transceiver used in
the Xbow’s MICA-Z and Telos B sensor nodes.
Figure 11 depicts the increasing TRC values according to the increasing number of revoked
nodes (l) when N = 512, 1024. For various number of the total nodes (N), Figure 12.(a) and
(b) depict TRC when one node is revoked (l = 1), and Figure 12.(c) and (d) depict TRC when
10% of nodes are revoked (l = 0.1N). From combinations of three key tree schemes (LKH,
OKD, and TKH), two rekeying strategies (User-oriented and Group-oriented), and two key tree
structures (binary and 4-ary), we observe the following principles between them in terms of the
total rekeying costs.
• TKH is superior to OKD and LKH in all cases.
• OKD is superior to LKH, given the same rekeying strategy and key tree structure.
www.intechopen.com
Group Key Managements in Wireless Sensor Networks 567
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
tot
al 
rek
ey
ing
 co
st 
[J]
total number of nodes (N)
 LKH(g) binary
 LKH(g) 4-ary
 OKD(g) 4-ary
 OKD(g) binary
 TKH
1024256128 512
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
tot
al 
rek
ey
ing
 co
st 
[J]
total number of nodes (N)
 LKH(u) binary
 LKH(u) 4-ary
 OKD(u) binary
 OKD(u) 4-ary
 TKH
1024256 512128
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
tot
al 
rek
ey
ing
 co
st 
[J]
total number of nodes (N)
 LKH(g) binary
 LKH(g) 4-ary
 OKD(g) 4-ary
 OKD(g) binary
 TKH
1024256 512128
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
tot
al 
rek
ey
ing
 co
st 
[J]
total number of nodes (N)
 LKH(u) binary
 OKD(u) binary
 LKH(u) 4-ary
 OKD(u) 4-ary
 TKH
1024256 512128
• User-oriented rekeying is superior to group-oriented rekeying, given the same logical
key tree scheme, rekeying strategy, and key tree structure.
• For LKH, 4-ary key tree is superior to binary key tree independent of the rekeying strate-
gies.
• For OKD(g), binary key tree is superior to 4-ary key tree. For OKD(u), 4-ary key tree is
superior to binary key tree.
By considering the topological information during the key tree construction, TKH always
incurs the lowest rekeying cost compared to the previous logical key tree schemes. Between
the logical schemes, OKD is superior to LKH by reducing rekeying messages due to its local
key computations. Since rekeying messages are individually delivered to each node in user-
oriented rekeying, it is more energy-efficient than group-oriented rekeying which combines-
and-broadcasts all rekeying messages. Given the same number of the total nodes, nodes in
a 4-ary key tree only stores the half number of keys compared to those in a binary key tree.
The reduced number of keys for each node translates into the reduced number of rekeying
messages for each node in user-oriented rekeying. Therefore, we observe that LKH(u) and
OKD(u) achieve lower rekeying costs when they utilize 4-ary key tree. However, while the
4-ary key tree is also optimal in LKH(g), it is inferior to binary key tree in OKD(g). This is due
to the fact that binary key tree is optimal for OKD’s local key computations in terms of the
number of the total rekeying messages. Our results are consistent with the results of (Li et al.,
2001) (Lin et al., 2005) that tried to find the optimal key tree structure for LKH and OKD in
terms of the total number of rekeying messages.
In Figure 11.(a),(b),(c),(d) respectively, TKH only requires 17.7%, 32.1%, 14.5%, 26.6% of TRC
compared to OKD(u) with 4-ary on average, while 13.9%, 25.4%, 11.8%, 21.8% of TRC com-
pared to LKH(u) with 4-ary on average. Compared to the best logical key tree scheme: OKD(u)
with 4-ary, TKH only requires 37.2%, 25.9%, 20.5%, 17.8% of TRC in Figure 12.(b) and 57.2%,
45.5%, 38.1%, 32.6% of TRC in Figure 12.(d) when N=128, 256, 512, 1024 respectively.
5.6 Effects of Wireless Channel Errors
During message delivery between nodes in wireless sensor networks, it is probable that a
transmitted message is corrupted due to wireless channel errors. Then the sender should re-
transmit the failed message and the receiver should retry to receive it which will consume
additional communication costs at both sides. In LKH and OKD, group-oriented rekeying
strategy uses multicast communications while user-oriented rekeying uses unicast communi-
cations to deliver rekeying messages. Our TKH utilizes the both communication methods ac-
cording to rekeying message types: {GK}TK is delivered by multicast communications, while
{TK}SK and {SK}IK are delivered by unicast communications. Therefore, message retrans-
missions incurred by wireless channel errors will have different effects on the total rekeying
costs of the three schemes.
In unicast communications between a pair of wireless nodes, let p be the probability that a
message is not received correctly at a receiver side (correctly received with 1−p). If we assume
the message length is L bits and bit error probability is pb, p would be p= 1−(1−pb)
L. Then
the expected number of transmission attempts required to successfully deliver a message in
wireless unicast (E(NU)) is
E(NU)=1×(1−p)+2×p(1−p)+3×p
2(1−p)+· · ·=
1
1−p
=
1
(1−pb)L
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Fig. 13. Effects of wireless channel error probability (pb = 10
−5) on TRC according to the
increasing number of revoked nodes (l) when N=1024.
However, in multicast communications between a group of wireless nodes, the probability of
a successful message reception would increase since a receiver can overhear multiple copies
of a message not only from a sender but also from its neighbors. Let us assume that each node
in multicast communications receives n copies of a message on average. Then the probability
that a multicast message is not received correctly at a receiver side is pn. Similar to (21),
the expected number of transmission attempts required to successfully deliver a message in
wireless multicast (E(NM)) is
E (NM) =
1
1−pn
=
1
1−(1−(1−pb)L)n
(21)
If we consider increased communication costs due to wireless channel errors, the total rekey-
ing costs of group-oriented and user-oriented rekeyingwill be increased by the rates ofE(NM)
and E(NU) respectively, while that of TKH is affected by both. By applying E(NU) and
E(NM) into the previous total rekeying costs in Section 4.4, we obtain
TRC′LKH(g)= TRCLKH(g) ×E(NM)LKH(g) (22)
TRC′OKD(g)= TRCOKD(g) ×E(NM)OKD(g) (23)
TRC′LKH(u)= TRCLKH(u) ×E(NU)LKH(u) (24)
TRC′OKD(u)= TRCOKD(u) ×E(NU)OKD(u) (25)
TRC′TKH = {(|m1|×tx1)·etx+(rx1)·erx}×E(NM)TKH (26)
+
{
3
∑
i=2
{(|mi|×txi)·etx+(rxi)·erx}+CCL+CRR
}
×E(NU)TKH.
To calculate E(NM) and E(NU) in the above equations, we input message lengths (L) from
(10)∼(13) and |mi| equations in Table 2.
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Fig. 14. (a) A sample sensor network connectivity graph of 100 nodes in an 1×1 unit square
area with r=0.171 (Pc=0.99). Sink node numbered as 1 is set to reside at the center of the area.
(b) A multicast source tree generated from the topology of Figure 14.(a) by using the DSA
heuristic.
Figure 13 depicts the increased TRC values due to the wireless channel error (pb = 10
−5) ac-
cording to the increasing number of revoked nodes when N=1024. We assume that each node
in multicast communication can hear two copies of a message on average (n = 2). For com-
parison purpose, we also plot the original TRC values of LKH, OKD, and TKH as dash, dot,
and solid lines respectively. Due to wireless channel errors, LKH(g) and OKD(g) obtain about
20% and 10% increases in their total rekeying costs respectively, while LKH(u) and OKD(u)
only obtain about 1% additional rekeying costs. Since group-oriented rekeying combines-
and-multicasts all rekeying messages simultaneously, it has a large message size. Therefore, it
suffers more fromwireless channel errors than user-oriented rekeying which delivers individ-
ual small rekeying messages to each node. By combining multicast and unicast communica-
tions and exploiting topological information, TKH is resistant to wireless channel errors (only
0.048% TRC increase in Figure 13). TKH’s multicast delivery of {GK}TK is more error-tolerant
than unicast since the message length is always ‘1’ while it can have multicast advantage.
Other two unicast rekeying message types ({TK}SK, {SK}IK) are also error-tolerant since they
also have very small message sizes.
6. Simulation Results
In the previous section, we provided the analysis of the total rekeying costs based on the
homogeneous ‘αβγ-tree’ topology model. In this section, we further investigate the rekeying
costs of TKH and other schemes in more general and heterogeneous sensor network topology
model.
Generating a typical sensor network multicast topology is consisted of two phases: connec-
tivity graph generation and multicast source tree generation. First, we generate a wireless sensor
network connectivity graph by using the Random Geometric Graph model (Penrose, 2003). Let
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us assume that N sensor nodes are randomly deployed in an 1×1 unit square area. Each
node has a common communication range of r, and a pair of nodes are connected if they re-
side within r to each other. The resulting network topology will be a graph (G) consisted of
vertices (V) of sensors and edges (E) of wireless connectivity.
Under the given deployment area of a sensor network, increasing the number of nodes (N)
or the communication range (r) will respectively increase the number of connections in the
network. To obtain the appropriate value of r which connects N sensor nodes with the desired
level of connectivity, we utilize the results from (Penrose, 1997). For N points placed uniformly
at random on the unit square in the 2-dimensional space, Penrose (Penrose, 1997) found an
asymptotic bound on the length of the longest edge (Mn) of MST (Minimum Spanning Tree)
as follows
lim
N→∞
Prob [Npi(MN)
2
− log N ≤ c] = exp(−e−c) (27)
with constant c. If we choose the communication range r the same as Mn, we can assure that
the graph is almost surely connected with probability of exp(−e−c) because all the nodes have
the communication range same as the longest edge of their MST. That is, given the value of N,
if we set r as Npir2−log N= c, “the probability that a given graph is connected” is exp(−e−c).
This probability is a “connectivity” of a graph which is denoted as Pc. By setting c according
to the desired level of connectivity, we can derive the communication range r. Figure 14.(a)
depicts a sample sensor network connectivity graph of 100 nodes in a unit square area with
r=0.171 (Pc=0.99).
Second, from the network graph generated by using the previous method, we now transform
it into a sink-based multicast source tree which actually delivers the central sink node’s multi-
cast messages on it. Among the many source tree generation algorithms (Diot et al., 1997), we
use the simple andwell-known algorithm: DSA (Dijkstra’s Shortest path Algorithm) heuristic.
If we overlap all the shortest paths from a source (s) to every nodes obtained from DSA (Cor-
men et al., 2001), we can build a multicast source tree starting from the central sink. However,
our TKH can apply to any multicast source tree structures. We depict the multicast source tree
in Figure 14.(b) which is generated from the Figure 14.(a) by using the DSA heuristic.
6.1 Simulation Results
In our simulations, we assume the network area of 1000×1000 size. For N = 512, 1024, we
randomly placed sensor nodes with the communication range (r = 82.1, 59.9) obtained by
setting the connectivity (Pc) as 0.99. We set the unit communication costs and the unit rekeying
message size same as the analysis settings. For LKH and OKD, binary and 4-ary key trees are
generated where each sensor node is randomly assigned in the key trees. TKH’s key trees
are automatically generated from the generated sensor network multicast topology. After
revoking randomly chosen node from a network, we calculated total rekeying costs of the
three schemes which occurred during the update of the group key of the remaining nodes.
We obtain the total rekeying costs by averaging 1000 independent simulation results for each
number of N.
Figure 15 depicts simulation results of TRC according to the increased number of revoked
nodes (l). We plot the graphs until 10% of nodes are revoked from N = 512, 1024. By com-
paring Figure 15 with 11, simulation results also possesses similar trends with the analysis
results. We also verify that the previous principles in terms of the total rekeying costs ob-
tained in analysis results are still hold in Figure 15. This confirms that our TKH always in-
curs lower rekeying costs compared to the logical key tree schemes. On average, TKH only
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requires 18.6%, 33.7%, 15.2%, 27.9% of TRC compared to the most efficient logical key tree
scheme (OKD(u) with 4-ary) in Figure 15.(a),(b),(c),(d) respectively.
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(b) N=512 (4-ary tree)
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(c) N=1024 (binary tree)
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Fig. 15. Simulation results of totla rekeying costs according to increasing number of revoked
nodes (l) when N=512, 1024.
Many researchers have proposed methods to construct an efficient multicast tree topology for
a multi-hop wireless network (Park & Sahni, 2005) (Wieselthier et al., 2002). These schemes
explicitly considers the wireless multicast advantage during multicast tree generation. For
example, by applying the sweep operation (Wieselthier et al., 2002) after the DSA heuristic
will modifies the multicast tree to adopt more sibling nodes in each sibling set. This kind
of wireless-optimized topology will further reduce the total rekeying cost of TKH.
7. Conclusions
In this chapter, we proposed energy efficient group key management scheme for a wireless
sensor network. By explicitly considering the topological information during a key tree gen-
eration, we showed that the Topological KeyHierarchy could greatly reduce the total rekeying
costs compared to the previous logical key tree-based schemes. After description of our key
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tree design principles, we proved performance improvements based on our detailed analysis
results. We further compared rekeying costs in realistic simulation environments. TKH only
requires about 10 to 30 percentages of rekeying costs compared to the best logical key tree
scheme (OKD(u) with 4-ary) in the network of 1024 sensors. We conclude that our TKH can
scale to large-scale sensor networks providing small rekeying cost for group keymanagement.
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Wireless Sensor Networks came into prominence around the start of this millennium motivated by the
omnipresent scenario of small-sized sensors with limited power deployed in large numbers over an area to
monitor different phenomenon. The sole motivation of a large portion of research efforts has been to maximize
the lifetime of the network, where network lifetime is typically measured from the instant of deployment to the
point when one of the nodes has expended its limited power source and becomes in-operational â€“
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deployment scenarios. In such a rich research area as wireless sensor networks, it is difficult if not impossible
to provide a comprehensive coverage of all relevant aspects. In this book, we hope to give the reader with a
snapshot of some aspects of wireless sensor networks research that provides both a high level overview as
well as detailed discussion on specific areas.
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